James Grant: Put bankers’ own assets on the line again.

The market is the best regulator. After almost 100 years, it’s time we brought it back.

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Jim Grant has been the living best banking historian since 1995 when Murray Rothbard kicked the bucket. Last week in WaPo, he put forth is old-time solution to banking reform: make bank executives and even shareholders personally liabile for depositors’ losses.

The trouble with Wall Street isn’t that too many bankers get rich in the booms. The trouble, rather, is that too few get poor — really, suitably poor — in the busts. To the titans of finance go the upside. To we, the people, nowadays, goes the downside. How much better it would be if the bankers took the losses just as they do the profits.

Of course, there are only so many mansions, Bugattis and Matisses to go around. And many, many such treasures would be needed to make the taxpayers whole for the serial failures of 2007-09. Then again, under my proposed reform not more than a few high-end sheriff’s auctions would probably ever take place. The plausible threat of personal bankruptcy would suffice to focus the minds of American financiers on safety and soundness as they have not been focused for years.

“The fear of God,” replied George Gilbert Williams, president of the Chemical Bank of New York around the turn of the 20th century, when asked the secret of his success. “Old Bullion,” they called Chemical for its ability to pay out gold to its depositors even at the height of a financial panic. Safety was Chemical’s stock in trade. Nowadays, safety is nobody’s franchise except Washington’s. Gradually and by degree, starting in the 1930s — and then, in a great rush, in 2008 — the government has nationalized it.
No surprise, then, the perversity of Wall Street’s incentives. For rolling the dice, the payoff is potentially immense. For failure, the personal cost — while regrettable — is manageable. Senior executives at Lehman Brothers, Citi, AIG and Merrill Lynch, among other stricken institutions, did indeed lose their savings. What they did not necessarily lose is the rest of their net worth. In Brazil — which learned a thing or two about frenzied finance during its many bouts with hyperinflation — bank directors, senior bank officers and controlling bank stockholders know that they are personally responsible for the solvency of the institution with which they are associated. Let it fail, and their net worths are frozen for the duration of often-lengthy court proceedings. If worse comes to worse, the responsible and accountable parties can lose their all.
The substitution of collective responsibility for individual responsibility is the fatal story line of modern American finance. Bank shareholders used to bear the cost of failure, even as they enjoyed the fruits of success. If the bank in which shareholders invested went broke, a court-appointed receiver dunned them for money with which to compensate the depositors, among other creditors. This system was in place for 75 years, until the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. pushed it aside in the early 1930s. One can imagine just how welcome was a receiver’s demand for a check from a shareholder who by then ardently wished that he or she had never heard of the bank in which it was his or her misfortune to invest.

Nevertheless, conclude a pair of academics who gave the “double liability system” serious study (Jonathan R. Macey, now of Yale Law School and its School of Management, and Geoffrey P. Miller, now of the New York University School of Law), the system worked reasonably well. “The sums recovered from shareholders under the double-liability system,” they wrote in a 1992 Wake Forest Law Review essay, “significantly benefited depositors and other bank creditors, and undoubtedly did much to enhance public confidence in the banking system despite the fact that almost all bank deposits were uninsured.”

Like one of those notorious exploding collateralized debt obligations, the American financial system is built as if to break down. The combination of socialized risk and privatized profit all but guarantees it. And when the inevitable happens? Congress and the regulators dream up yet more ways to try to outsmart the people who have made it their business in life not to be outsmarted…

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For the record, I agree 100% with Grant’s solution. Moral hazard is THE cause of the de-facto bankruptcy of nearly every major bank in the US.
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The US banking system pre-1913 was not perfect (unscrupulous bankers were always trying to use the power of the government’s guns to game the system), but it was much safer and more honest than today’s.
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Bankers did not yet have a license to blow bubbles, since there were no black checks from their creation, the Federal Reserve, which can simply print paper money to bail them out in the inevitable busts. Before the Fed, their own assets were on the line, and before FDIC, the depositors’ assets were at risk. These two parties had a very strong incentive to keep lending standards prudent.
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There were booms and busts, but they were localized, and at no time did the entire banking system become insolvent like it has been since 2008. Weak banks lost their depositors to those who had been prudent, and depositors knew that they were taking a risk when they chose a bank paying higher interest.
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In sum, the market is the best regulator. It’s time we brought it back.
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